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INTRODUCTION
Respondents Stouffer Foods, Inc. and The Travelers
Insurance Company (collectively "Stouffer") hereby submit their
response to Petitioner Reva Brunson's ("Brunson") Petition for
Review of an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah
("Commission") denying Brunson's claim for Workers' Compensation
benefits.

The Commission concluded that Brunson had not met the

requisite burden of proving her employment with Stouffer was the
medical cause of her injury, and thus denied her claim. The
Commission thereby affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions
of law entered by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on the
case.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over Brunson's Petition for
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-82.53, -86 (1994), §
63-46b-16 (1993), and § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994) and Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Stouffer submits that the issue on appeal and the
governing standard of review are as follows:
Issue:

Whether the Commission erred in holding that

Brunson failed to meet the medical causation aspect of her burden
of proving her injury arose out of and in the course of her
employment at Stouffer.

Standard of Review:

The substantial evidence standard

governs the review of this issue-

The Commission found that

Brunson's work activities were not the medical cause of her
injury,

(R. 64.)

"Medical causation . . .

is a factual matter."

Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

As such, the Commission's findings must be affirmed if

they are "'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court.'"

Grace Drilling Co. v.

Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988)(unchanged in current
version)).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of

evidence but less than the weight of the evidence.

Id. at 68.

It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.

Id.

Brunson also states that the substantial evidence
standard governs the Court's review of the issue raised on
appeal, but she misapplies the test.

In her argument, Brunson

asserts that the Commission erred by arbitrarily disregarding
competent evidence, and merely posits that certain evidence
exists which supports a finding of medical causation.
for Petitioner at 8, 9-10, 13.)

(See Brief

As indicated by the statute and

case law cited above, the issue is not whether evidence exists
which contravenes the Commission's findings.
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Instead, the Court

must inquire whether the Commission's decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Stouffer submits that the following statutes are
determinative of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994)
and § 63-46b-16 (1993).

These statutes are set forth in full at

Addendum "A."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brunson seeks review of the Commission's Order
affirming the Order of the ALJ and denying Brunson's claim for
Workers' Compensation benefits.

The Commission denied Brunson's

claim for benefits because Brunson did not prove that her work
activities were the medical cause of her injury.

(R. 64.)

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Brunson filed an Application for Hearing with the
Commission on February 22, 1994, seeking medical expenses and
temporary total disability benefits.

(R. 1-2.)

Brunson therein

asserted that an injury she suffered in a fall while working at
Stouffer arose out of her employment.

(R. 1.)

Stouffer

responded that there was no causal connection between Brunson's
fall and her employment, and that she therefore was not entitled
to workers' compensation benefits.
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(R. 12.)

A hearing before the ALJ was held on August 31, 1994.
(R. 24.)

The ALJ concluded that Brunson's fall and resulting

injury did not arise out of her employment with Stouffer, and
accordingly denied workers' compensation benefits.

(R. 29.)

Specifically, the ALJ found that Brunson's employment and related
activities were not the legal cause or the medical cause of her
injury.

(R. 27.)

Brunson filed a Motion for Review with the

Commission on November 10, 1994.

(R. 32-40.)

On February 17,

1995, focusing on the issue of medical causation, the Commission
denied Brunson's Motion and denied her claim for workers'
compensation benefits.

(R. 109.)

Statement of Facts
Brunson's injury occurred on December 7, 1993.

(R. 5.)

At that time, she was approximately seventy-five years old and
had been employed by Stouffer for three days.

(R. 25.)

Her job

involved standing at and monitoring a conveyer belt on the 3:00
p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift.

(R. 25.)

On the night of her injury,

she was working overtime.

At approximately 12:15 a.m., Brunson

began to feel light headed and suddenly fell over backwards,
hitting her head on a tile floor.

(Id.)

She was taken to

Mountain View Hospital in Payson where she remained for three
days.

(R. 3, 25.)
At the time of her fall, Brunson had been awake for

over twenty hours; she had been up since 6:00 a.m. the previous
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morning.

(R. 25.)

She had rested before going to work, had

taken a meal break from approximately 7:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.,
(id.), and had also taken several other breaks during the
evening.

(R. 51, 60.)

She testified at the hearing before the

ALJ that she believed her fall was due to the fact that she was
wearing an additional undershirt, and that the extra clothing had
caused her to become too warm, or that she had not eaten enough
carbohydrates.

(R. 25-26.)

over a bout with bronchitis.

Additionally, she was just getting
(R. 26.)

She had also, on at least

one previous occasion, fainted after getting over a cold.

(R.

170; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 1.)
One week after Brunson's fall, Dr. Dean Egbert, the
emergency room physician who had treated her at Mountain View
Hospital, wrote that, other than becoming lightheaded, "no other
specific cause of the blacking out episode was found."
He added:

(R. 46.)

"Considering the nature of this work, I think that the

most likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to
watching the conveyer belt go past her."

(Id.; Brief for

Petitioner, Addendum C.)
After examining Brunson, Dr. Kevin J. Colver, a
consulting physician, (R. 3), wrote in his consultation report:
"Syncope.

This is probably due to a generalized weakness and

working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout with
bronchitis.

She may have also had some labyrinthitis with some
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vertigo which could have been exacerbated by the motion of the
conveyer belt."1

(R. 46; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 2.)

In responding to subsequent questions put to him by Brunson, Dr.
Colver clarified his consulting report by stating, in pertinent
part:
I did feel the most likely cause of your
fainting was, "due to a generalized weakness
and working too hard on her feet after
getting over a bout of bronchitis." My
records indicate that you had a cough from
which you were recovering when you went back
to work and had the accident. The sentence
in Mr. Wahlquists [sic] letter which states,
"Dr. Kevin Colver reported that your fainting
was probably due to your getting over a bout
with bronchitis" is accurate.
(R. 45; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum B.)
Brunson's attending physician at Mountain View Hospital
was Dr. John R. Clark.

(R. 3.)

hospital discharge summary.

Dr. Clark prepared Brunson's

He there indicated the cause of

Brunson's fall was "[s]yncope, recurrent."

(R. 156.)

He also

prepared the Summary of Medical Record submitted to the
Commission.

In response to a question contained in the Summary

asking whether there was a "medically demonstrative causal
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems you

Syncope is defined as "a partial or complete temporary
suspension of respiration and circulation due to cerebral
ischemia: FAINT" Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1197
(1988).
-6-

have been treating," Dr. Clark wrote "yes."

(R. 5; Brief for

Petitioner, Addendum D.)
Another physician, Dr. David T. Roberts, ran an
electroencephalogram ("EEG") on Brunson, the results of which he
characterized as "abnormal."

(R. 195.)

He elaborated that some

of the measured wave forms "appear[ed] suspiciously epileptiform
in character."

(Id.)

There is no indication in his report

whether he ascribed, or could ascribe, the abnormalities to her
fall at Stouffer, or its cause.

(See R. 195-96.)

A hearing on Brunson's Application for Adjustment of
Claim was held on August 31, 1994, before the ALJ.

(R. 24.)

At

the hearing, Victoria Nelson, a registered nurse employed by
Stouffer for seven years, testified that she had seen employees
working on other conveyer belts made nauseous and light headed by
the movement of the belts. Most such individuals were pregnant.
The nurse added that, to her knowledge, no one had become
nauseous or light headed while working the conveyer belt Brunson
had been monitoring, which was designed differently.

(R. 26.)

The ALJ found that the preponderance of the evidence
showed that "Brunson's injury coincidentally occurred at work
because of her idiopathic condition without any enhancement from
the workplace."

(R. 26.)

In his findings of fact, the ALJ

specifically considered Nurse Nelson's testimony, Dr. Roberts's
EEG findings, and Dr. Colver's consultation report.

-7-

(R. 26.)

The ALJ concluded that, "[a]1though there has been speculation
about why she had the fainting episode, there is no evidence
which has been set forth which meets the standard of a reasonable
medical probability."

(R. 26-27,)

Moreover, the ALJ found:

Prior to and at the time of her syncopal
episode and fall, Mrs. Brunson was not
engaged in any activity which created any
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that
of her normal nonemployment life or the
normal nonemployment life of any other
person. Her syncopal episode and injury did
not result from any strain, exertion, or
stress related to her employment.
(R. 27.)

Thus, because he found the fall was related to a

syncopal episode and was not legally or medically caused by her
employment activities, the ALJ ruled that Brunson's injury did
not arise out of and in the course of her employment, and thus
ruled that she was not entitled to workers' compensation
benefits.

(R. 27-29.)
On November 10, 1994, Brunson filed a Motion for Review

with the Commission.

(R. 40.)

She argued that the ALJ ignored

evidence indicating that "her work activities and conditions had
aggravated her internal infirmities, causing an accident."
32.)

(R.

Stouffer responded that, in fact, the ALJ had considered

the evidence in the medical record,2 and properly concluded
2

In her Motion for Review, Brunson faulted the ALJ for not
considering the clarifying letter of Dr. Colver, and the letter
of Dr. Egbert, both quoted above. (R. 35-36.) However, in its
Reply Memorandum, Stouffer pointed out that Brunson had not made
these letters a part of the medical record that was before the
-8-

therefrom that Brunson had not satisfied her burden of
demonstrating that her injury was caused by her employment
activities.

(R. 49-53.)

In its Order Denying Motion for Review dated February
17, 1995, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision, and
dismissed Brunson7s Motion for Review.

(R. 64.)

In its findings

of fact, the Commission adopted and summarized the findings of
fact set forth by the ALJ.

(R. 63.)

The Commission specifically

considered the written statements of Drs. Egbert, Colver, and
Clark quoted above.

Commenting on the evidence before it, the

Commission stated that "Brunson can only speculate as to the
cause of her fainting spell."

(Id.)

It observed that the

doctors' "conjectures" were inconsistent and did not establish
causation with reasonable medical certainty.

(R. 64.)

Under the

circumstances, the Commission ruled that Brunson had failed to
ALJ, notwithstanding that Brunson had the medical record for six
weeks before the hearing date, which was once postponed, and thus
had ample time to review and supplement it. (R. 48.) At no time
did Brunson indicate there were any records missing from the
medical record. Under these circumstances, Stouffer argued it
was improper for Brunson to then supplement the record, and that
the Commission should not consider the new records. (Id.) See,
e.g., Workers' Compensation Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d
572, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)("Unless such evidence is brought
into the case, and in some lawful manner made a part of the
record, it cannot be regarded as competent evidence, and must be
excluded in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings of the Industrial Commission."). Moreover,
Stouffer argued, the two letters at issue did not demonstrate the
causation that the ALJ had ruled was lacking. (R. 49-50). In
any event, the Commission considered these letters in rendering
its opinion (See R. 63-64.)
-9-

meet her burden of proving medical causation, and thus denied her
claim for workers' compensation benefits.

(Id.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal to this Court, Brunson seeks to reverse the
Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission ignored
evidence in reaching its conclusion that Brunson failed to
establish that her employment activities were the medical cause
of her accident.

(Brief for Petitioner at 9.)

Brunson's

argument fails for several reasons.
First, Brunson has failed to properly raise the issue.
Medical causation is a factual issue, and the relevant standard
of review is the substantial evidence standard.

Under this

measure, a petitioner must marshal all of the evidence in favor
of the Commission's decision and demonstrate why it does not
support the Commission's conclusion.

Brunson has not marshaled

the evidence in accord with this requirement and thus her appeal
should be dismissed.
Second, an examination of the merits demonstrates that
the Commission's conclusion is indeed supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the entire record.

The evidence

in the record Brunson claims supports a finding of medical
causation is speculative, conjectural, and inconsistent.
Moreover, contrary to Brunson's contention, the Commission did
not ignore any of the evidence before it.
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It considered all of

the evidence Brunson set forth, including the statements of Drs.
Egbert, Colver, and Clark, but simply reached a different
conclusion therefrom than the one Brunson advanced.

It is the

Commission's duty and prerogative to weigh the factual evidence
before it and give the evidence such weight as it deems
appropriate.

Simply because a reviewing court might reach a

different conclusion than that reached by the Commission is not
grounds for reversal, as long as the Commission's conclusion is
supported by substantial evidence.

In light of the inconclusive

and inconsistent evidence in the record on the issue of medical
causation, the Commission's finding is supported.by substantial
evidence, and thus this Court should affirm it.
Third, regardless of the result as to medical
causation, Brunson's appeal must still fail because she has
failed to properly raise the issue of legal causation on appeal.
In order to receive workers' compensation benefits, a claimant
must establish that her employment activities were both the
medical and the legal cause of an injury.

The ALJ ruled Brunson

had not demonstrated medical or legal causation.

The Commission

affirmed without reaching the question of legal causation because
it found that Brunson did not prove medical causation.

In her

brief to this Court, Brunson focuses almost exclusively on
medical, rather than legal causation.

Her few, perfunctory

comments on the latter issue do not suffice to perfect an appeal

-11-

on that issue.

Therefore, the ruling below on the issue of legal

causation must stand, and Brunson's appeal should be dismissed,

ARGUMENT
I.

BRUNSON HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DENYING HER
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND THUS HER APPEAL OF
THAT ORDER SHOULD BE DISMISSED

Brunson has failed to properly challenge the
Commission's decision in two respects:

first, she has failed to

marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's decision,
which she is required to do when challenging a factual finding of
the Commission; and second, she has failed to provide transcripts
of the hearing before the ALJ and the Commission, which she is
also required to do when challenging a factual finding of the
Commission.

This Court has previously held that such

deficiencies require that the Court treat the Commission's
findings of fact as conclusive.

Brunson is therefore prohibited

from challenging the Commission's factual findings and,
accordingly, her appeal should be dismissed.
As indicated in the Statement of Facts section above,
the focus of Brunson's appeal is on the medical causation aspect
of her workers' compensation claim.

The issue of medical

causation is a question of fact, to be resolved by the
Commission.

Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah

Ct. App. 1990).

On appeal, the Commission's decisions on issues
-12-

of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct.
App. 19 89).

In applying this standard, this Court has repeatedly

emphasized that a party challenging the Commission's findings of
fact "must marshal1 all of the evidence supporting the findings
and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence."

Id. at 68; Johnson v. Board

of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Stewart v.
Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) .
Where a party fails to marshal the evidence in support
of the Commission's findings and then demonstrate that those
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, this Court
"accept [s] the Commission's findings as conclusive."

Merriam v.

Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Johnson,
842 P.2d at 912; Stewart, 831 P.2d at 138.

Accordingly, in

Merriam, this Court held that if a party fails to "marshal," and
the Commission has entered a finding of no medical causation, the
Court should accept the Commission's finding as conclusive and
affirm the Commission's denial of workers' compensation benefits
812 P,2d at 450-51.
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Brunson has made no attempt in her brief to marshal the
evidence so as to satisfy the burden imposed by the substantial
evidence standard of review.

Her challenge to the Commission's

decision consists essentially of an argument that it erred in
finding no medical causation because certain evidence in the
record purportedly indicates otherwise.
8, 9-12.)

(Brief for Petitioner at

Arguing that evidence exists that may undercut the

Commission's decision is insufficient to meet her marshalling
burden.

Instead, Brunson is required to marshal all of the

evidence supporting the Commission's decision, and then, in light
of the record as a whole, demonstrate why the Commission's
finding of no medical causation is unsupported by the evidence.
See, e.g., Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)("[Petitioner] . . . failed to meet its
obligation to marshal the evidence by persistently arguing its
own position without regard for the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings, and failing to demonstrate that the findings
were against the [weight of the relevant standard of review].11);
Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)("When
appellant attacks the evidence, we begin our analysis with the
trial court's findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of
the way the trial court should have found.").
to comply with this requirement.

Brunson has failed

Thus, this Court should adopt

-14-

the Commission's finding of no medical causation as conclusive,
and accordingly should affirm the Commission's decision.
Brunson's appeal should also be dismissed because she
has failed to provide a transcript of relevant portions of the
hearing before the ALJ.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act,

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1 (1993 & Supp. 1994), provides that the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure govern this Court's review of
agency actions.

Id. § 63-46b-16(2)(b) (1993); King v. Industrial

Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Rule 11(e)(2)

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in turn provides:

"If the

appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion."

Utah R. Appellate P. 11(e)(2);3

see also King, 850 P.2d at 1285 ("Rule 11 requires counsel
provide the appellate court with all evidence pertinent to the
issues on appeal.

Thus, our procedural rules specifically

require a petitioner to provide a transcript of the proceedings
if he is going to challenge factual findings under subsection 6346b-16(4)(g)." (citations omitted)).

3

The rule continues: "Neither the court nor the appellee is
obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the
relevant portions of the transcript." Utah R. Appellate P.
11(e)(2).
-15-

As noted above, Brunson is challenging the Commission's
findings on the medical causation issue — an issue of fact.

Some

of the evidence supporting the Commission's finding of no medical
causation was adduced at the hearing before the ALJ.

(See, e.g.,

R. 26 (according to nurse's testimony at hearing before ALJ, no
one had had fainting problems on the conveyer line where Brunson
worked).)

Accordingly, under Rule 11(e)(2), Brunson was

specifically obligated to include a transcript of portions of
evidence heard by the ALJ, King, 850 P.2d at 1285, but failed to
do so.

The Court therefore does not have a complete record

before it and should presume that the Commission's decision was
supported by competent and sufficient evidence.

Horton, 794 P.2d

at 849; Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .4

In this case, such a presumption voids Brunson's

argument that the Commission erred in finding no medical

4

Sampson states that where a transcript has not been
submitted on appeal, and the court thus does not have a complete
record before it, which creates the presumption that a lower
court's findings are supported by competent and sufficient
evidence, ,,xthe findings must [nevertheless] themselves be
sufficient to provide a sound foundation for the judgment, and
conversely . . . any proper judgment can only be entered in
accordance with the findings.'" 770 P.2d at 1002 (quoting
Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1978)). Here, the
Commission's finding of no medical causation, which must be
presumed under Sampson, supports the Commission's ultimate denial
of workers' compensation benefits because medical causation is a
prerequisite to an award of benefits under the workers'
compensation system. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15,
25, 27 (Utah 1986).
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causation.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the

Commission's decision.

II.

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DENYING BRUNSON'S MOTION
FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND THUS HER
APPEAL OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDER SHOULD BE
DISMISSED

The record before the Court demonstrates that the
Commission's finding of no medical causation is supported by
substantial evidence.

The evidence simply does not prove that

Brunson's employment activities were the medical cause of her
injury.

The Commission did, in fact, consider the evidence in

the record, and specifically evaluated the statements of
Brunson's doctors which she contends were ignored.

The

Commission judged them to be of little consequence and thus,
within its discretion, properly gave them little weight and
rejected Brunson's contention that her employment was the medical
cause of her injury.

Because the Commission's factual finding of

no medical causation is supported by substantial evidence, the
Court should affirm the Commission's decision and dismiss
Brunson's appeal.
To recover workers' compensation benefits, a claimant
must demonstrate both legal and medical causation.

Allen, 729

P.2d at 25; Willardson v. Industrial Comm'n. 856 P.2d 371, 374-75
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Brunson has appealed the Commission's
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decision on the latter causation issue, (See Brief for Petitioner
at 9-13), which was the focus of the Commission's opinion, (R.
64).

The purpose of the medical causation test is "to ensure

that there is a medically demonstrable causal link between the
work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries that resulted
from those strains" and to "prevent an employer from becoming a
general insurer of his employees and discourage fraudulent
claims."

Allen, 729 P.2d at 27.

Therefore, if a claimant cannot

show a medical causal connection between the claimant's
employment and claimed injury, compensation must be denied.

Id.

at 27.
To satisfy the medical causation requirement, a
claimant must show "that the stress, strain, or exertion required
by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or
disability."

Id.

The claimant must make this showing by a

preponderance of the evidence.

Virgin, 803 P.2d at 12 88; Large

v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

As

demonstrated below, in light of the entire record Brunson has not
sufficiently demonstrated that her employment activities led to
her injury.
In her brief before the Court, Brunson contends the
Commission ignored the statements of Drs. Colver, Egbert, and
Clark, as well as the testimony of Nurse Nelson.

Ironically, the

Commission did consider each of the statements advanced by
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Brunson, and concluded the statements were speculative and
inconsistent as to medical causation.

(R. 63.)

For example, Brunson argues Dr. Colver's statement
establishes medical causation.
little.

He wrote:

"Syncope.

However, his words establish
This is probably due to a

generalized weakness and working too hard on her feet after
getting over a bout with bronchitis.

She may have also had some

labyrinthitis with some vertigo which could have been exacerbated
by the motion of the conveyer belt."

(R. 46 (emphasis added);

Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 2 (emphasis added).)

Even in

ostensibly clarifying his opinion, Dr. Colver could muster no
more definite opinion than to reiterate:
the most likely cause of your fainting was,
"due to a generalized weakness and working
too hard on her feet after getting over a
bout of bronchitis."
My records indicate
that you had a cough from which you were
recovering when you went back to work and had
the accident. The sentence in Mr. Wahlquists
[sic] letter which states, "Dr. Kevin Colver
reported that your fainting was probably due
to your getting over a bout with bronchitis"
is accurate.
(R. 45 (emphasis added); Brief for Petitioner, Addendum B
(emphasis added).)

Dr. Egbert's statement is as flaccid:

"Considering the nature of this work, I think that the most
likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to
watching the conveyer belt go past her."

(R. 46 (emphasis

added); Brief for Petitioner, Addendum C (emphasis added).)
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Neither of these statements suffices to establish
medical causation.

The purported opinions are stated in terms of

likelihood and probability, and in terms of "may" and "could."
The Utah Supreme Court has previously indicated that such
equivocal terms are indicia of uncertainty and not of sufficient
medical certainty to satisfy the medical causation requirement.5
See, e.g., Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 239-41 (Utah
1987)(holding medical opinions using terms "probably" and
"likely" were not statements of medical certainty sufficient to
demonstrate claimant's injury was caused by work related
factors).
Brunson also relies on the purported opinion of Dr.
Clark.

Dr. Clark's statement, however, is not what Brunson

believes it to be. Dr. Clark prepared the Summary of Medical
Record submitted to the Commission.

In response to a question

contained in the Summary asking whether there was a "medically
demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial accident
and the problems you have been treating," Dr. Clark wrote "yes."
(R. 5; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum D.)

5

Again, at best for

Brunson cites to an American Medical Association guidebook
for definitions of the terms possibility and probability. It
defines the former as less than a 50% chance and the latter as
signifying a greater than 50% chance. Ironically, neither the
statements of Dr. Colver, nor the statement of Dr. Egbert, use
these terms. Moreover, the guidebook states that the two terms
are only "sometimes used" to connote these meanings. (Brief for
Petitioner at 11-12.) Thus, the guidebook is of little value.
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Brunson, this statement affords inconclusive support. Although
it speaks in terms of medical causation, on its face it indicates
nothing more than that the accident, or in other words Brunson's
fall to the floor, caused the injuries he treated.

It does not

ask whether Brunson's employment caused the injury, or even
whether Brunson's employment caused the fall which in turn
resulted in the injury.

It merely asks whether her fall resulted

in the injury treated — his affirmative answer thus does not
assist Brunson in making her proof of medical causation. Cf.
Helf v. Industrial Comm'n, 271 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 & n.3 (Utah
Ct. App. August 24, 1995)(characterizing doctor's conclusion that
patient's injury was work related merely because it was suffered
while patient was performing duties at work as "not particularly
helpful to determine medical causation" because there was no
support to show the injury arose from patient's employment
activities).

Dr. Clark's direct statement as to the cause of

Brunson's injury has no employment connection:
recurrent."

"Syncope,

(R. 156.)

Lastly, Nurse Nelson's testimony also does not assist
Brunson's claim.

She testified before the ALJ that in her seven

years of experience with Stouffer, she had seen employees working
other conveyer belts made nauseous and light headed by the
movement of the belts.

(R. 26.)

However, she added that most

such individuals were pregnant and that, to her knowledge, no one

-21-

had become nauseous or light headed while working the conveyer
belt Brunson had been monitoring, which had been designed
differently.

(Id.)

Thus, her testimony similarly does not

establish the requisite medical causation.
Not only do these statements fail to establish that
Brunson was injured as a result of her employment activities,
there is other evidence in the record that affirmatively suggests
her employment activities at Stouffer were not the cause of her
injury.

For example, at the time of her fall, Brunson had been

awake for over twenty hours; she had been up since 6:00 a.m. the
previous morning.

She claimed she had eaten too few

carbohydrates and was wearing extra clothing (an extra
undershirt) which caused her to become too warm.

(R. 25-26.)

She was just getting over a bout with bronchitis, (R. 26), and
had on at least one previous occasion fainted after getting over
a cold, (R. 170; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 1 ) .
Additionally, the post-fall EEG revealed abnormal results — some
of the measured wave forms appeared suspiciously epileptiform in
character.

(R. 195.)

However, there is no indication in the EEG

report whether the doctor ascribed, or could ascribe, the
abnormalities to Brunson's fall at Stouffer or to the cause of
the fall.
The opinions of the doctors on which Brunson relies
also provide affirmative support for the Commission's finding of
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no medical causation.

For example, Dr. Clark identified the

cause of Brunson's fall as "[sjyncope, recurrent."

(R. 156.)

This statement, particularly in light of her previous fainting
episode, indicates that the problem is a recurring one, which
suggests Brunson's injury was not caused by her work activities.
Also, in his clarifying letter, Dr. Colver attributed Brunson's
fainting to her getting over a bout with bronchitis.
Brief for Petitioner, Addendum B.)

(R. 45;

Thus, Brunson's doctors

provide support for the Commission's conclusion that her injury
was not caused by her employment activities.
Even to the extent the testimony of Drs. Colver,
Egbert, and Clark, as well as that of Nurse Nelson, may be
construed to lend some support to Brunson's claim of medical
causation, the additional evidence set forth above provides
nonemployment-related causation theories.

The Commission is

charged with finding facts, drawing inferences therefrom, and
resolving conflicting evidence.

Under the substantial evidence

standard of review, this Court has consistently held that it will
"not substitute its own judgment as between two reasonably
conflicting views, even though it may have come to a different
conclusion."

Virgin, 803 P.2d at 1287; King, 850 P.2d at 1285;

Grace Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68.

"*It is the province of the

Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same
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evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences.'" Virgin,
803 P.2d at 1287 (quoting Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68). In
light of the entire record before the Court, the Commission's
conclusion that Brunson had not satisfactorily demonstrated
medical causation is an appropriate resolution of conflicting
testimony, particularly where the evidence adduced by Brunson in
her favor is speculative in nature and inconsistent.

See

Lancaster, 736 P.2d at 240 ("Not one of the doctors was willing
to state with medical certainty that the claimant's injury was
caused by work-related factors.

Thus, there is competent and

comprehensive medical evidence in the record upon which the
administrative law judge could rely in concluding that medical
causation was lacking.").

Accordingly, this Court should affirm

the Commission's denial of benefits.

III. BRUNSON HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING OF NO LEGAL
CAUSATION AND THUS HER APPEAL OF THE
COMMISSION'S ORDER SHOULD BE DISMISSED
Brunson's appeal must also be dismissed because she has
not properly challenged the determination below of no legal
causation, nor has she demonstrated a legally sufficient causal
link between her employment and her injury.

In order to recover

workers' compensation benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that
the claimant's employment activities were both the medical and
legal cause of an injury.

Allen. 729 P.2d at 25. Because a
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claimant is required to prove both legal and medical causation,
"failure to prove either one precludes recovery,"

Smallwood v.

Board of Review, 841 P.2d 716, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

The ALJ

specifically found that Brunson's employment activities were not
the legal cause of her injury.

Thus, Brunson's failure to

properly challenge this finding and to show that her employment
was the legal cause of her injury is fatal to her appeal, because
regardless of the result on medical causation, she is precluded
from recovering benefits.
Brunson has not properly raised the issue of legal
causation with the Court.

It is not expressly raised in the

Docketing Statement, nor is it adequately briefed to this Court,
nor was it fully briefed below.

The ALJ specifically concluded

that "[n]either Mrs. Brunson7s employment nor any activities
related thereto were the legal cause or medical cause of her
injury."

(R. 27.)

In her Motion for Review to the Commission,

Brunson included only one substantive heading.

It is styled "THE

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IGNORED COMPETENT, RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE WHEN HE FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHICH MEETS THE
STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL PROBABILITY AS TO AN INDUSTRIAL
CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT."

(R. 37.)

Her argument in

the Motion for Review went to that point.6 This is confirmed by
6

In the final paragraph of the Motion, Brunson asserted that
she is entitled to workers1 compensation benefits if her
preexisting condition is aggravated by her employment activities.
-25-

the Commission's Order, which observed that "the focus of this
case is on the requirement of medical causation."

(R. 64.)

In

the end, the Commission found that Brunson had failed to prove
medical causation and on that basis denied her claim for
benefits.

(Id.)

The Commission did not explicitly reach the

issue of legal causation, but it adopted the findings of fact of
the ALJ and affirmed his decision.

(R. 63-64.)

In her Docketing Statement, Brunson stated that the
issue for review was "WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY
IGNORING COMPETENT, RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT AND BY FINDING NO
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT OCCURRED."

(R. 77.)

Although Brunson's use

of the term "industrial cause" is vague, it should not be

(R. 39-40.) In one sentence therein, she stated that standing at
the conveyer belt for periods of time is not an activity engaged
in by people in everyday, nonindustrial life. (R. 40.) This
does not suffice to raise the issue of legal causation. First,
in cases such as this that involve preexisting conditions, (see
infra note 7 ) , the medical causation test necessarily inquires
whether the injury was caused by a work-related activity rather
than the preexisting conclusion. See Willardson. 856 P.2d at
375; Virgin, 803 P.2d at 1287-88. Otherwise, one could not make
the requisite showing that the employment was the medical cause
of the injury. Thus, discussion of preexisting condition in the
medical causation context makes sense. Brunson made her
aggravation argument to support her argument on medical
causation; she nowhere indicated that she was challenging legal
causation. Even if her argument concerning preexisting
conditions could be construed to raise the legal causation issue,
her perfunctory treatment of the issue is insufficient for this
Court to consider it on appeal. Utah R. Appellate P. 24(a)(9);
S e w v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 961 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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stretched here to include both the medical and legal prongs of
the causation test, because her statement of facts relevant to
her appeal go only to the Commission's failure to find medical
causation.

(See R. 80-83.)

Nowhere does she discuss facts

relevant to the issue of legal causation.
The statement of issue in Brunson's brief before this
Court is similarly stated.

In her section entitled "Detail of

Argument," however, she narrows the argument before the Court to
one of medical causation by stating in the only caption
thereunder:

"THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IGNORED COMPETENT,

RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE WHICH MEETS THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL
PROBABILITY AS TO AN INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S
ACCIDENT."

(Brief for Petitioner at 9 (emphasis added).)

Although she includes a brief discussion of her preexisting
condition in her argument section, and two sentences of comments
on the exertions of an ordinary person in everyday, nonindustrial
life, (id. at 12-13), it is done in the context of her medical
causation argument, (see supra note 6 (discussing necessity of
treating preexisting condition issue in medical causation
context)), and is supported, she claims, by the medical
observations of Brunson by Drs. Colver and Egbert.
discussion of the legal causation element.
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There is no

Accordingly, she has

not adequately raised the legal causation issue on appeal to this
Court.
Additionally, Brunson's cursory treatment of legal
causation fails to adequately bring the matter before this Court.
(See supra note 6 (discussing and defining requirement of
adequate briefing to appellate court).)

Brunson has not

expressly raised the issue in the Docketing Statement, nor has
she adequately briefed the issue below or to this Court.
Therefore, Brunson cannot attack the ALJ's finding of no legal
causation.

Because it is necessary to make out both medical and

legal causation to collect workers' compensation benefits, and
the finding of no legal causation is uncontested, Brunson is not
entitled to collect such benefits and her appeal must fail.
Finally, Brunson has still not demonstrated that her
employment activities were the legal cause of her injury.
Brunson's employment involved standing, with several breaks
during her shift, at a conveyer belt.

Under Allen, "[t]o meet

the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting
condition7 must show that the employment contributed something

7

Brunson admits that at the time of her syncopal episode,
she was suffering from a preexisting condition. (Brief for
Petitioner at 12-13.) She was recovering from "a cough without
fever, chills, sweats and a sore throat," (id. at 4-5.), "and
consequently, may have been in a weakened state," (id. at 13).
Additionally, she previously had fainted after getting over a
cold, (R. 170; Brief for Petitioner, Addendum A at 1 ) , and Dr.
Clark diagnosed her problem as "[s]yncope, recurrent," (R. 156).
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substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday
life because of his condition."

729 P.2d at 25.

This additional

element of risk in the workplace is satisfied by an unusual or
extraordinary exertion, greater than that undertaken in normal,
everyday life.

Id. at 25-26.

The extra exertion is required "to

offset the preexisting condition of the employee as a likely
cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work."
Id. at 25.
To determine whether an activity is greater than that
undertaken in normal everyday life, the Utah Supreme Court has
adopted an objective standard.

Id. at 26-27.

It looks "not [to]

what [the] particular claimant is accustomed to doing," but to
"what typical nonemployment activities are generally expected of
people in today's society."

Id. at 26; see also City of

Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (Ala. Civ. App.
1975)(the employment risk must be a "danger or risk materially in
excess of that to which people not so employed are exposed."); 1A
Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
§ 38.83(b), at 7-320 to -321 (1995) ("Note that the comparison is
not with this employee's usual exertion in his employment but
with the exertions of normal nonemployment life of this or any
other person.")
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Brunson's standing and walking on her feet during her
shift, with breaks, is not an activity materially in excess of
the activities expected of an average person in our society.
Being on one's feet for extended periods is a basic, virtually
essential feature of modern life.

Standing at work is no

different than spending a day shopping at the mall, doing the
week's grocery shopping, or caring for and cleaning a home, all
of which require lengthy periods of standing.

By including

standing on one's feet under the rubric of "extraordinary
exertion," Brunson would have this Court define the requirement
out of existence.

If something so elemental to human function

could qualify as an unusual or extraordinary exertion, little
could subsequently be excluded from meeting the condition the
Supreme Court has mandated as a prerequisite to obtaining
recovery in the context of a preexisting condition.

As a result,

employers would become responsible for aggravations of
preexisting conditions that are as likely to happen in
nonemployment activity as at work, but which through happenstance
occur at the workplace — a result contrary to the Supreme Court's
stated policy.

See Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. Thus, this Court

should reject Brunson's argument that her activities at Stouffer
were extraordinary and unusual compared to those undertaken by a
person in today's society, and dismiss her appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Stouffer respectfully
requests that this Court deny Brunson's Petition for Review and
affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission.

The Commission's

decision denying Brunson workers' compensation benefits is
supported by substantial evidence.
otherwise.

Brunson has not shown

Not only has she failed to properly put the

Commission's decision at issue — b y neglecting to marshal the
evidence in support of the decision and by failing to provide a
transcript of facts at issue developed before the ALJ to enable
an adequate review of the record — but the evidence in the record
does not establish that her employment activities were the
medical and legal cause of her injury.

Failure to satisfy either

one of these aspects of causation is fatal to a workers'
compensation claim in Utah.
both.

Here, Brunson has failed to satisfy

The purported medical opinions are inconsistent and

speculative and thus do not establish medical causation with any
degree of medical certainty.

To the contrary, they contain

substantial evidence refuting Brunson's claim of medical
causation.

Moreover, Brunson has not properly raised and briefed

the issue of legal causation.

She also has not demonstrated a

legally sufficient causal link between her employment and her
injury because her employment activities were not outside the
typical, nonemployment activities of the average person.
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Thus,

Brunson has not only failed to carry her burdens, she has refused
to assume them.

Accordingly, Stouffer asks this Court to dismiss

Brunson's appeal and affirm the Commission's Order denying
Brunson workers' compensation benefits.
DATED this A

day of September, 1995.
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ADDENDUM

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be
paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its
insurance carrier and not on the employee.
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63-46b-16- Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedingsCD As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
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